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Abstract
We evaluate the effect of technology, demographics and policy on the differ-
ential evolution of the skill premium and on the rise in education investment in
France and the USA. We use a computable general equilibrium model with over-
lapping generations of individuals, and endogenous education decisions. Human
capitalismadeoftwosubstitutablecomponents, experienceandeducation, bothof
them evolve endogenously over time. We calibrate this model on the post-war pe-
riod and run counterfactual experiments to assess the effect of the different exoge-
nous variables. French expansionary education policy boosted the supply of skills
and kept the skill premium low. On the contrary, increasing education costs in the
US contributed to increase wage differentials by reducing the supply of skills. The
skill biased technical shock is key to understand rising school attendance and ap-
pears delayed in France.
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During the last three decades, most industrialized countries have experienced a re-
markable increase in the educational attainment of their labor force. The average skill
level is expected to increase further in the coming years as younger (and more edu-
cated) cohorts progressively replace older (and less educated) ones. In spite of this,
returns to skills have also increased substantially in countries such as the US, the UK
and, to a lesser extent, Canada. By contrast, in most countries of continental Europe,
the skill-premium has remained constant or has decreased as in France. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1 for the US and French cases. It represents estimates by Wasmer
(2001a) of the skill premium for different levels of education. We clearly observe the
contrast between France, where the skill premium actually declined, and the US. On
the contrary, the qualitative pattern of the return to experience is similar in both coun-
tries: as reported in Figure 2, it peaked in the eighties, then declined in both countries.
However, the magnitude of the changes is stronger in France.
The existing literature has explained the contrast between France and the US by
referring to differences in labor market institutions: in face of a skill-biased techni-
cal progress affecting both countries, the US reacted by displaying a higher skill pre-
mium while France minimum wage legislation and/or unemployment insurance pre-
vented unskilled workers’ wages to fall (see Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998), Marimon
and Zilibotti (1999)). Consequently, unemployment rates clearly increased in Europe
(increased somewhat in Canada) and not in the US. Such a story is however not fully
convincing. If differences in the ﬂexibility of labor market institutions actually explain
a diverging path of skill premium, we should observe diverging patterns of employ-
ment rates (employment – population ratio) as well. Indeed, facing a similar shock,
responses of employment rates are expected to be stronger in low ﬂexibility coun-
tries. Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) show that the evolution of employment
rates across age and education groups in France, Canada and the US is almost iden-
tical. They conclude that a pure labor market rigidity cannot explain the diverging
pattern of wage inequality and employment.
Building on the idea that the long-run path of wages is determined by demand and
supply changes in the labor market, this paper provides an alternative (neo-classical)
interpretation for the diverging path of wage inequality. Typically, we will argue that
general equilibrium phenomena can explain returns to skills and wage inequality in
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3the last decades without relying on labor market rigidity features. We shall disentangle
the effect of demographic variables, changes in participation rates, education policy
and technical change.
Some stylized facts clearly illustrate the magnitude of supply shocks. Population
data by age for 1960, 2000 and 2050 are presented in appendix A. The main difference
between France and the US is for the period 2000-2050, where aging is much more
pronounced in France. The share of individuals aged 65 and more rises from 18.9%
in 1960 to 23.3% in 2000 and 36.6% in 2050 in France; it rises from 16.7% in 1960 to
18.8% in 2000 and 30.2% in 2050 in the US. The importance of aging can affect current
labor market outcome, through expectations; labor supply will indeed be more scarce
in France than in the US, and future wages can thus be expected to be higher. Another
signiﬁcant difference between the US and France lies in the investment in education.
Appendix B reports the share of time invested in education for the population aged
15 to 24. Education was much higher in the US around 1960, but France caught-up
and almost rejoined the US level in 2000. This trend dramatically increased the supply
of skills in France, and may have reduced the skill premium. Magnac and Thesmar
(2002) explain the rise between 1982 and 1993 by a change in the French education
policy, which increased the chance for students to reach higher levels of education.
Another difference between the US and France concerns the participation rate of old
workers. Figure 11 shows the effective retirement age as computed by Blondal and
Scarpetta (1997). The stronger drop in France should have reduced the incentive to
accumulate skills since the productive time of education investment is shortened.
In this paper, we study the effect of these global trends on the labor market, and in
particular on the returns to human capital, and on the investment in education. Fol-
lowing Becker (1964), human capital is built essentially through on-the-job-training
and schooling; on-the-job-training reﬂects the idea that “many workers increase their
productivity by learning new skills and perfecting old once while on the job”. In the
micro-econometric literature on wage formation (Mincer-type equation), both educa-
tion and experience are shown to have a strong inﬂuence on individual earning. Ac-
cordingly, we deﬁne human capital as having two major and substitutable compo-
nents, education and experience. Education and experience have never been distin-
guished in existing general equilibrium models with realistic demographics, which
at most endogenize labor participation rates per age. The hypothesis of perfect sub-
stitution between young workers and old workers is a common assumption in that
4literature. An exception is the paper by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) who use
a general equilibrium model with a sophisticated labor market. They calibrate their
human capital production functions using econometric estimates of wage equations,
however, they do not simulate their model with realistic population scenarios.
The model described in section 2 is distinct from the existing literature by three
features: education and experience are two components of human capital, households
optimally choose their investment in education, and households have access to perfect
insurance markets to face lifetime uncertainty. We calibrate the model on the post-
war period for France and the USA in section 3, using detailed demographic data,
age proﬁles for taxes and transfers, and observations for educational attainment, re-
tirement age and participation rates. Exogenous processes for technical progress and
private costs of education are identiﬁed by letting the model match observed skill pre-
mia and investments in education. In section 4 we run counterfactual experiments and
compute the endogenous path for skill premia and education when each exogenous
variable is kept at its 1960 level. This gives us estimated marginal effects of technol-
ogy, demographics and policy on the difference in the observed evolution of the skill
premium in France and the USA. Three results arise. French expansionary education
policy boosted the supply of skills and kept the skill premium low. On the contrary,
increasing education costs in the US contributed to increased wage differentials by re-
ducing the supply of skills. The skill biased technical shock is key to understand rising
school attendance and appears delayed in France. Section 5 provides sensitivity anal-
ysis of some of our assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model economy
Ourmodeldepictsaclosedeconomywiththreeagents: households, ﬁrmsandthepub-
lic sector. Individuals are homogenous1 within each generation and live a maximum
of 8 periods of time (i.e. from age 15 to 95), each of them representing 10 years.
1It should be noted that our model is calibrated so as to match representative behavior of French and
American residents, including natives and foreign-born. As Illustrated in Borjas (2001) for the US, the
1965 “Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act” has drastically changed the national origin
mix and the relative skills of immigrants, increasing their difference with natives. Obviously, a model
with heterogeneous agents as in Storesletten (2000) would allow to examine the relative contribution of
immigration to rising wage inequality and educational attainment.
52.1 Demographics
At each date, some individuals die and a new generation appears. Households reach-
ing age 15 at year t belong to generation t. The size of the young generation increases
over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t+1 = N0,tmt
where N0,t measures the initial size of generation t and mt is one plus the demographic
growth rate, including both fertility and migration.
Each household lives a maximum of 8 periods (a = 0,...,7) but face a cumulative
survival probability decreasing with age. The size of each generation declines deter-
ministically through time. However, this decline is attenuated by immigration ﬂows:
Na,t+a = N0,tβa,t+a + Ma,t+a
where 0 ≤ βa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t alive at age a (hence, at period t+ a)
and Ma,t+a is the stock of migrants of age a. We also have β0,t = 1. Obviously, the total
population at time t amounts to Nt = ∑
7
a=0 Na,t.
The demographic growth rate, immigration ﬂows and the survival probability vec-
tor vary over time. Taking account of immigration ﬂows enables us to use ofﬁcial
demographic observations and projections.
2.2 Preferences
Individuals have an uncertain lifetime duration, i.e. a probability to die at the end
of each period of life. In the spirit of Arrow-Debreu, we postulate the existence of a
market for every contingent consumption. These markets open before the resolution
of uncertainty: each individual has the possibility to insure himself against uncertainty
at the beginning of his life. Hence, the problem of agents born at time t is to select a
consumption contingent plan and the duration of his education in order to maximize
his expected utility subject to his intertemporal budget constraint, given the sequence
of contingent wages and prices.






where ca,t+a is the consumption of generation t at age a.
The budget constraint requires equality between the expected value of expendi-
tures and the value of income. The expected value of income incorporates education
decisions, public transfers and a mandatory retirement age. For a standard household






















t+a is the consumption tax rate at period t + a; pa,t+a is the price of one unit of
good in case he/she is alive at age a; Ta,t+a denotes the amount of transfer received at
age a including education beneﬁts, pensions and other transfers (health care, family al-
lowances, social beneﬁts...); `a,t+a measures labor supply at age a; raw labor, education












`0,t − p0,t [c0,t(1 + τc
t ) − T0,t] (3)














For a household already living at the initial date, i.e. with age j = 1...6 at date 0,





















The variable sj−1,−1 represents the initial asset holdings of this individual. This budget
7constraint is also the one of a migrant entering the country at age j. For simplicity,
we assume that migrants of each generation have the same characteristics as a native
household and have the same implicit wealth, experience and education.
2.3 Education and experience
The vector of labor supply for generation t (deﬁning labor supply at all ages) is
`t = (qt(1 − ut), qt+1, qt+2, qt+3, qt+4(1 − αt+4), 0, 0, 0) (6)
where qt is the exogenous participation rate at time t, 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1 measures the en-
dogenous time invested in education in the ﬁrst period of life and αt+4 stands for the
(exogenous) time spent in retirement in the ﬁfth period of life (i.e. between age 55 and
age 65). The variable qt will be useful to capture the rise in women’s participation rates
in the labor market.
The education decision made in the ﬁrst period of life is extremely important since
it completely determines the vectors of experience, skills, education subsidies and pub-
lic transfers for generation t. Following Wasmer (2001b), the individual stock of expe-
rience sums up past participation rates on the labor market. The stock of education
transforms education investment when young into labor efﬁciency according to a de-
creasing return function. Public transfers sum up education subsidies, pension beneﬁts
and other transfers. These vectors are written as
et =
￿
0, (1 − ut)θ1
eqt, (1 − ut)θ2
eqt + θ1























t , 0, 0, 0
￿
, (8)




0,t + γ0gt, γ1gt+1, γ2gt+2, γ3gt+3,
αt+4bt+4 + γ4gt+4, bt+5 + γ5gt+5, bt+6 + γ6gt+6, bt+7 + γ7gt+7), (9)
8where vt is the rate of subsidy on the cost of education, bt is the pension beneﬁt allo-
cated to each full-time retiree at period t and γagt is the amount of age-related transfer
made by the government to agents of age a2. The parameter γa describes the share of
total transfer gt in favor of age a.
2.4 Technology
At each period of time, a representative ﬁrm uses labor in efﬁciency units (Qt) and
physical capital (Kt) to produce a composite good (Yt). We assume a Cobb-Douglas






where ϕ measures the share of wage income in the national product, and At is an
exogenous process representing total factor productivity.
The quantity of efﬁciency units of labor combines physical labor supply and human
capital according to a Cobb-Douglas transformation function. Human capital is itself
a combination of experience and education according to a CES nested transformation











where Lt measures the input of manpower at time t; Et measures the input of expe-
rience; Ht is the input of education; δ is a parameter representing the importance of
human capital in the determination of labor income; 1−ρ is the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution between experience and education and µ is a parameter of preference
for experience. Finally Θt is an exogenous skill biased technical progress.
We assume that workers belonging to different age groups are not perfect substi-
tutes, because they have a different education/experience mix. However, the stocks of
education and experience are homogeneous. The interest of this approach is that it is
independent of the number of periods of life considered. If we had a model with gen-
erations living 55 periods, the production function (11) would remain unchanged. This
is an advantage of our framework compared to Card and Lemieux (2001), who aggre-
2This variable only capture transfers which can be used for private consumption.
9gate different age-groups speciﬁc human capital within a CES production function. In
their approach, the number of embedded CES functions depends on how many groups
they are.
The representative ﬁrm behaves competitively on the factor markets and maxi-
mizes proﬁts:
Yt − (rt + d)Kt − wL
t Lt − wH
t Ht − wE
t Et (12)
where d is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
2.5 The public sector
The government issues bonds and levies taxes on labor earnings (τw
t ), consumption
expenditures (τc
t ) and capital income (τk
t ) to ﬁnance public transfers and general public
consumption. Five types of spending are distinguished: education subsidies, social
security beneﬁts, other transfers (health care, family allowance, social beneﬁts), non
age-speciﬁc general consumption expenditure and interest payments on public debt.
The government budget constraint may be written as
τw
t (wL
t Lt + wE
t Et + wH
t Ht) + τc
t Ct + τk
t rtKt + Dt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt
= N0,tvtqtutwL
t (1 − τw
t ) +∑
a





where Dt denotes the public debt at the beginning of period t; ϑt is the share of non-
transfer public consumption in GDP and γagt is the amount of transfer per capita
allocated to individuals of age a.
Several scenarios can be considered to balance this budget constraint. The budget
can be balanced through tax adjustments, expenditure adjustments or changes in the
public debt. We assume in the sequel that the path of debt is given and the tax rate τw
t
adjusts to balance the budget.
2.6 Equilibrium
At each date, the composite good is taken as numeraire. The spot price is thus normal-
ized to one: pt = 1. We denote by rt+1 the interest rate between dates t and t + 1, the
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t+a. They corresponds to the marginal productivities of labor components,
as shown below.
Since there is perfect competition on the insurance market, the contingent prices
are related to the spot prices through a set of no arbitrage conditions. The equilibrium
(discounted) contingent prices of the consumption good at time t are given by:
pa,t+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+apt+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+a (14)














t+a denotes the rate of tax on labor income at time t. The originality of the
model is that labor income consists of three components: manpower, experience and
education. Equivalently, individual gross wages are the sum of these three elements so
that a tax on labor income τw
t affects similarly all wage components.















t represents the asset holdings brought into the country by migrants. It is
given by:
K?




sa−1,t−1 (Na−1,t−1 − N0,t−aβa−1,t−1)
where the terms between brackets is the ﬂow of migrants between date t and date t−1.
11To avoid modelling the speciﬁc behavior for migrants over their life, we consider that
they enter the country with an asset level sa,t−1 given by (3)-(4), i.e. equivalent to that
of the natives of the same age.
The labor market equilibrium equalizes the demand for labor from ﬁrms Lt, Et and














Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Given a demographic structure summarized by
{Na,t}a=0..7,t≥0, an initial distribution of education {u−j}j=1..4 and wealth {sj−1,−1}j=1..7, a
competitive equilibrium is
• a vector of individual variables {ca,t,ut,`a,t,ea,t,ha,t}a=0..7,t=a..+∞ such that utility (1)
is maximized subject to the constraints (2), (6), (7), (8), and (9);
• a vector of individual variables {ca,0,`a0,ea,0,ha,0}a=1..7,t=0..7−a such that utility (1) of
the ﬁrst old generations is maximized subject to the constraints (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9);
• a vector of ﬁrms’ variables {Kt, Lt, Et, Ht}t≥0 such that proﬁts (12) are maximized sub-
ject to technology (10)-(11);
• a vector of taxes τw
t balancing the budget of the government (13);
• a vector of contingent prices {pa,t+a,ωL
a,t+a,ωE
a,t+a,ωH
a,t+a}a=0..7,t≥0 such that the no
arbitrage conditions (14)-(15) hold;
• a vector of interest factor and gross wages {rt,wL
t ,wE
t ,wH
t }a=0..7,t≥0 such that the goods






for the ﬁrst period.
2.7 Optimality conditions
Since there is no disutility of labor, the problem of households is separable.
12• Individuals ﬁrst maximize the expected value of income - right hand side of (2) -
with respect to educational investment ut.
• Then, in a second step, they maximize the expected utility function and select the
optimal contingent plan subject to the budget constraint in which the education
investment is set to its optimal value.































Obviously, the optimal education investment balances the marginal gain of education
at the numerator (future path of net return on education) and the marginal cost of
education at the denominator; the marginal costs includes both the foregone wage
when young and foregone net return on experience.
Maximizing utility with respect to the levels of consumption determines the law of
motion of contingent consumption expenditures over the lifetime:
ca+1,t+a+1 =




ca,t+a ∀a = 0,...,6 (19)
Substituting (18) and (19) into the budget constraint (2) gives the optimal level of
consumption in the ﬁrst period of life. The aggregated consumption at period t then
amounts to Ct = ∑a Na,tca,t.
The proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms requires the equality of the marginal productivity
of each factor to its rate of return. They may be written as
rt = (1 − ϕ)AtYt/Kt − d (20)
wL



































13Clearly, the supply of experience and the supply of education inﬂuence the ratio of













If ρ is lower than one, and increase in the stock of experience stimulates the rate of
return on education. Any technical change Θt will also affect the ratio.
Given the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, national product is equal to the
sum of capital income and labor income:
Yt = (rt + d)Kt + (wL
t Lt + wE
t Et + wH
t Ht)
3 Calibration
Two model economies are calibrated (one for France and one for the US) in order to
reproduce some characteristics of these countries. Calibration implies using data for
observed exogenous variables, ﬁxing some constant parameters, and chosing paths
for the unobserved exogenous variables in order to match a series of characteristics.
Calibration is not focused on reproducing characteristics of a given steady state, where
all the interesting information on population history, experience stocks and skills per
age group would be lost. Instead, the equilibrium is computed as a transition from one
steady state in 1900 to one another in 2250. By starting in 1900, the stocks of education
and experience around 1960 reﬂect the correct history of the population. We focus our
attention on the year 2000 (i.e. the period 1995-2004) to target some characteristics of
the data.
3.1 Observed exogenous variables
Demography. Past and future population shares per age are taken from ofﬁcial demo-
graphicinstitutes. ForFrance, weuse observationsandforecasts fromINED(2001) and
INSEE (1995). For the US, data and forecasts are taken from the Population Division
of the US Census Bureau. As for demographic projections, we use the central scenario
for both countries. For France and US, the population aged 95 and more is not taken
14into account. The data are presented in appendix A.
Education and participation rates. Appendix B presents the data on education and
participation rates. The time invested in education is computed using school atten-
dance measures and educational attainment. The old age participation rate α is com-
puted using the effective retirement age data. Overall participation rates qt are nor-
malized to 1 in 2000 and computed from Wasmer (2001a).
Public ﬁnance. In our model, we have three proportional taxes: the labor income tax,
the capital income tax and indirect taxes. We also distinguish two types of government
spending (net of debt charges): non age-speciﬁc public consumption and age-speciﬁc
transfers taken from generational accounting studies. Social security beneﬁts and other
individual transfers evolve exogenously. The path of public debt is given exogenously,
and the labor income tax adjust to balance the budget. Appendix C describes the data
sources for these variables.
3.2 Parameters
A set of parameters is set a priori, the same for both countries. By doing so, we mini-
mize the amount of assumed differences between France and the US. The labor share
in output, ϕ, is set to 0.7, (this value is commonly used in calibrated model of the US
economy. In France, the labor share equals 0.693 in 1995, according to INSEE.) The
depreciation rate of capital d equals 0.4. This value implies an annual depreciation
rate of 5%. The depreciation rate of experience will follow the median hypothesis of




e)2 etc ... The parameter µ in the production function is a scale parameter of no
importance given the later choice of Θt; it is set to 0.5. Two parameters are important
in shaping the wage proﬁle per age: the share of raw labor in labor income (1 − δ) is
set to 0.4, and the scale parameter in the production function of human capital e is set
to 1.2. They will both deliver an adequate wage proﬁle (see below).
The two elasticity parameters are of special importance. The parameter ρ deter-
mines substitution between education and experience. It is set to -0.9 according to Was-
mer’s (2001a) estimates, implying a low substitutability (1/(1−ρ) = 0.52) between the
two components of human capital. The parameter ψ is the elasticity of education cap-
ital to investment in education. It should be calibrated using the estimated elasticity
15of future earnings with respect to additional schooling (see e.g. Psacharopoulos (1994)
for a survey of these elasticities); we take the value ψ = 0.6 which is in accordance with
a return to an additional year of schooling of 11.5%, assuming that this additional year
of schooling raises education expenditure by 20%.
3.3 Identiﬁcation of unobserved exogenous variables
Explaining skill premium and educational investment requires identifying exogenous
variables for which time series data are not available. Our methodology follows two
steps. We ﬁrst deﬁne a baseline scenario where we use the model to identify the unob-
servedexogenousvariables. Inthisstep, theskillpremiumandeducationalinvestment
will be matched exactly by the model. In the second step, we compute the hypothetical
path of the skill premium and education investment by keeping constant different ex-
ogenous variables; by doing so we evaluate the relative contribution of each exogenous
process on the endogenous outcomes.
There are ﬁve unobserved exogenous variables: total factor productivity, At, the
rate of subsidy on education expenditures, vt, the skill-biased technical progress, Θt,
the level of pension beneﬁt, bt, and the scale of the age-speciﬁc transfer proﬁle, gt.
These ﬁve exogenous processes are chosen so as to match available time series data for
ﬁve endogenous variables which are closely related to the unknowns: the GDP growth
rate, the share of social security and other transfers in GDP, the education investment
of young cohorts and the return on education. The return on education is based on the
data provided in the introduction. For the skill premium prior to 1960, we consider it
constant at its 1960 value.3
Basically, our identiﬁcation process implies swapping ﬁve exogenous variables for
ﬁve endogenous variables and solving the identiﬁcation step with the algorithm pro-
posed by Laffargue (1990) and Boucekkine (1995).4 The identiﬁcation of the education
policy captures changes in the characteristics of the education system. The skill-biased
technical progress captures changes in the productivity of skills, affecting the demand-
side of the labor market. The technical change is allowed to differ across countries.
3An alternative is to use Goldin and Katz (1999) who provide data since 1920; unfortunately, such
estimates are not available for France.
4Our identiﬁcation process resembles Sims (1990) backsolving method for stochastic general equi-
librium models. We use a similar idea of treating exogenous processes as endogenous, not to solve a
model, but as a calibration device in a deterministic framework.
16Our backsolving identiﬁcation procedure allows to calibrate the model “dynami-
cally”. This is much better and rigorous than calibrating on a hypothetical steady state
(in 1900 or in 2250) and re-scaling exogenous variables to obtain reasonable outcomes
at a given date, as it is usually done in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) tradition.
To match labor market trends over the period 1960-2000, we need to specify agents’
expectations about the future. The expectations over the period 2010-2080 are indeed
important to determine the optimal behavior over the period 1960-2000. We now de-
scribe our main assumptions:
• the shares of public pensions and other transfers in GDP are kept constant (this
usually requires individual beneﬁts to grow at a lower pace than labor produc-
tivity). This assumption is in line with the US projections of the Congressional
Budgetary Ofﬁce;
• the public debt – GDP ratio is constant after 2000;
• between 2000 and 2030, retirement age will gradually increase from age 58.7 to
60 in France, reﬂecting current policy changes. In the US, retirement age is kept
constant at age 62.5;
• theUSeducationalattainment(amongthepopulationaged25andmore)matches
US ofﬁcial projections. The educational attainment projections are reported in
Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000). They are based on separate educational at-
tainment rates by race, ethnic groups, gender, age and nativity status. We opt for
the ”high” projection scenario in which the proportion of population aged 30 to
35 and graduating from high school and more grows from 89.6% in 2003 to 94.8%
in 2028 (from 59.2% to 70.2% for College and from 28.7% to 32.2% for Bache-
lor’s). Compiling these numbers to obtain the average time devoted to education
between age 15 and 24, it appears that the time invested in schooling increases
from 59.1% in 1990 to 67.0% in 2030. We consider that French educational attain-
ment of future young cohorts will converge toward the US level between 1990
and 2035; it implies that time invested in education will grow from 51.0% in 1990
to 67.0% between 1990 and 2030.
• in both countries, the growth rate of GDP linearly converges within two decades
toward a long-run level of 20% per decade.
17• in both countries, the skill premium is kept at its last observed value; as this
conjecture is not based on any available information, section 5 will provide a
sensitivity analysis to this assumption.
3.4 Identiﬁed shocks
Before doing the counterfactual experiments, let us brieﬂy examine the result of our
identiﬁcation process. Figure 3 depicts the implicit education subsidies vt between
1950 and 2050 and the identiﬁed skill-biased technical progress, Θt.
Education policies are very different. Between 1960 and 1980, the French educa-
tional policy was highly expansionary while in the US, it became strongly discourag-
ing in the early seventies and the eighties. There are several stylized facts explaining
this difference. In France, student strikes of May 1968 initiated a deep debate on the
role of educational policies. In the eighties, the Government announced its objective
of an 80% pass rate for the baccalaur´ eat. Various speciﬁc policies have been intended
to decrease the cost of education. In the US, OECD indicators show that the share of
public spending on total education expenditure fell over time. It decreased from 88%
in 1988 to 75% in 1995 (47% only for higher education programs). It should be noted
that France’s corresponding percentages were 88% in 1988 (as in the US) and 92% in
1995. After 2000, expected educational policies became rather stable.
This difference in education policies is corroborated by considering the ratio of the
price index of education goods (Tuition, other school fees, etc.) to the overall price
index. Figure 4 plots these “relative prices” of education for both countries. For the
US (right panel), the ratio of the two price indexes show that the cost of education in
terms of the aggregate consumption good doubled between 1978 and 2002, reﬂecting
sharp increases in tuition fees. For France, there is no decline, but the rise in the cost of
education is much smaller.
Looking deeper into the US cost structure of education (from the Department of
Education), we observe that nominal tuition and required fees have increased by a
factor of 6.10 from 1976 to 2000 in private institutions, and by a factor of 5.42 in public
institutions. The cost of dormitory rooms has increased by a factor of 5.19 in private
schools (4.41 in public schools). The cost of boarding has increased by a factor of 3.78
in private schools (3.37 in public schools). Over the same period the overall price index
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19increased by a factor 2.72.
Going back to Figure 3, we observe that, between 1970 and 2000, skill-biased tech-
nical change was strong in the US but not in France. In the literature, skill-biased
technical change has been related to investment in information technology and/or to
patterns of international trade. As far as information technologies are concerned, data
presented in Kaufman, Luzio, and Dunaway (2001) display a pattern similar to our
measured technical progress: the percentage of GDP allocated to investment in infor-
mation technology rose in the US from 7.5% to 9% between 1992 and 1999, while it
stayed constant in France, around 6%. Moreover, Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999)
report that the proportion of workers using a computer is somewhat higher in the US
than in France (37.4% in US in 1989 and 34% in France in 1991). Machin and Reenen
(1998) relate the skilled-biased technical change to R&D intensity. Their data show
that the share of R&D in GDP increased both in France and the US, but stays 3% higher
in the US over the period 1973-1989. Concerning international trade, Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux (1999) show that the US also experienced a larger increase in the Im-
ports/GDP ratio from less developed countries between 1973 and 1993 (the higher are
the imports from low-wage countries, the more the country is specialized in high skill
activities).
After 2000, our model exhibits a convergence process between the countries even
if, in the long-run, the skill bias keeps stronger in the US.5 This result is consistent with
the vast literature on the technical leadership of the US economy. Since 1870, Europe
growth performances have been driven by delayed technological innovation simply
accomplished by mimicking the US achievement. According to Gordon (2002), the
current dominance of the US in information and communications technology (ICT) can
be related to issues such as patent protection, securities regulation, the role of venture
capital and the large funding policy of hi-tech companies.
Following our identiﬁcation procedure, it takes between 20 and 30 years for France
to adopt US knowledge. This is somewhat lower than the delay observed for the major
past innovations. The transformation of Western Europe achieved by electricity and
internal combustion began in the 1950s, almost 40 years after than in the United States.
Similarly, the percentage of French households owning a car mimicked the equivalent
US ratio roughly 40 years later.
5For a model explaining why technological leadership may persist even at steady state, see Cozzi
(2002).
20How can we explain such a delay of 20-30 years? A host of studies have found
evidence that the recent skill biased technical progress leads to organizational changes
within ﬁrms (employees perform a wider range of tasks and have more responsibil-
ity). Caroli and Reenen (2001) provide evidence that organizational changes leading to
increases in productivity can only be observed in workplaces with high levels of skills.
On this basis, they ﬁnd some support for a stronger skill biased technical change in
Britain than in France. Similarly, the US leadership appearing on Figure 3 can be seen
as resulting from a higher level of education of the US labor force in the 1970s and
1980s. As shown on ﬁgure 10 in the appendix, the educational attainment of young
French cohorts in 1990 equals that of US young cohorts in 1970, i.e. 20 years later.
3.5 Wage and assets proﬁle per age
The quality of our model depends on its ability to match individual proﬁles per age.
Let us focus on wage and wealth proﬁles. Figure 5 provides the wage proﬁle per age
for the year 2000, comparing for each country the model’s outcome with data (INSEE
for France and PSID for the US). The concave shape of the proﬁle per age is fully de-
termined by the accumulation and depreciation of experience; no need to assume an
exogenous proﬁle as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). This ﬁgure comforts us in the
choice of δ, e and θe.
It is usually argued that the standard life cycle model with selﬁsh households does
not provide a good description of wealth accumulation after retirement. Figure 6 re-
ports asset proﬁles per age at time 2000, together with their empirical counterpart (IN-
SEE for France and PSID for the US). It appears that our model matches the proﬁle,
except for the very old people (85-94). Hence, there is no need to suppose a pure time
preference parameter on top of the mortality rate. The annuity market is also helpful
to avoid poverty in the old age.
3.6 The return to experience
The return to experience is an endogenous outcome of the model. Figure 7 gives the
simulated return to 20 years of experience for France and the US. Combining equation
21Figure 5: Wage proﬁle over age






































Note: Wages are measured in domestic currencies, current prices
Figure 6: Asset proﬁle over age
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22Figure 7: Simulated return to experience (20 years)
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which is a decreasing function of Et/Lt and Θt.
Changes in both the population structure per age and technology are the driving
forces affecting the experience premium. Between 1960 and 1980, the average experi-
ence of workers (as measured by Et/Lt) fell in both countries. As a result, the return to
experience increased over that period, which is reﬂected in Figure 7. Our simulations
correctly depict the fact that the experience premium increased more in France than in
the US between 1960 and 1980. This difference between the two countries is mainly
due to the stronger skill biased technical change in the US. Indeed, the average expe-
rience of workers decreases more in the US than in France. Without technical progress
(as measured by Θt), the rise in the experience premium would have been stronger in
the US. However, the US skill biased technical change did offset an important part of
the rise in the experience premium.
Between 1980 and 2020, aging induces a sharp increase in the average experience
of workers. This explains why the return to experience starts decreasing in 1980, an
evolution which is compatible with Wasmer’s numbers presented in Figure 2. For the
next decades, our simulations provide a similar time path for both countries. The rise
in the stock of experience is lower in France (+20%) than in the US (+30%) but the
23French skill biased technical change produces its effects after 2000 and reinforces the
impact on the experience premium.
4 Explaining skill premium and education paths
Our analysis will now rely on counterfactual experiments. We compute six hypothet-
ical paths of skill premia and educational attainment, each path being obtained by
keeping one exogenous variable at its level of 1960. The six exogenous variables we
consider are: demographics (including mortality, fertility, and migration), skill-biased
technical progress, overall participation rate, the effective retirement age, welfare pro-
grams, and education subsidies. Such experiment allows us to evaluate the marginal
impact of each exogenous variable on endogenous variables. Table 1 provides the con-
tribution of these exogenous variables to the rise in educational attainment for France
and the US. Each number represents a cumulated impact on the time devoted to edu-
cation between age 15 and 24 (ut).
Educationalattainmentincreaseswithlifeexpectancy, skill-biasedtechnicalprogress,
educationsubsidiesandparticipationrates. Inbothcountries, theimpactofthechanges
in the welfare state policy (taxes and transfers) and in demographics is rather low. The
increasing participation rate of women on the labor market explains an important part
of education decisions. This is also true for the decrease in effective retirement age, es-
pecially in France. The major difference between France and the US concerns the role
of educational policies: between 1960 and 1970, the French educational policy became
expansionary. The positive impact on education investment was especially strong in
the seventies and the eighties; in the US, the discouraging education policy became
important in the late seventies and the eighties.
Table 2 provides the contribution of each exogenous variable on the skill premium
for France and the US. The skill premium measures the wage increase enjoyed by an
individual investing 30% of his time in education compared to an individual with no
education investment between age 15 and 24:
wH(e0.3ψ)
wL
Since the eighties, demographic shocks have exerted a negative impact on the skill pre-
24Table 1: Explaining the changes in school attendance (deviation from 1960 value)
France US
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
Demographics −0.02 −0.01 +0.05 +0.07 −0.04 +0.01 +0.09 +0.05
Technical bias +0.00 +0.04 +0.18 +0.26 +0.25 +0.30 +0.32 +0.35
Participation rate +0.02 +0.06 +0.09 +0.11 +0.04 +0.07 +0.09 +0.09
Early retirement −0.04 −0.08 −0.09 −0.10 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
Welfare state −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 +0.00
Education policy +0.05 +0.10 +0.12 +0.12 +0.06 −0.11 −0.16 −0.15
Table 2: Explaining the changes in the skill premium (% deviation from 1960 value)
France US
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
Demographics −0.01 −0.02 −0.06 −0.06 +0.09 +0.04 −0.05 −0.07
Technical bias −0.06 −0.02 −0.14 −0.05 −0.13 −0.03 +0.14 +0.10
Participation rate −0.02 −0.05 −0.08 −0.11 −0.02 −0.05 0.08 −0.08
Early retirement +0.05 +0.08 +0.10 +0.08 +0.03 +0.02 +0.03 +0.04
Welfare state +0.01 +0.03 +0.06 +0.06 +0.01 +0.02 +0.03 +0.03
Education policy +0.03 −0.06 −0.23 −0.34 −0.06 −0.05 +0.07 +0.16
miuminbothcountries. However, before1985, theeffect ofdemographicswaspositive
in the US: the impact of the demographic structure on the stock of experience was more
important than the stimulating effect on the stock of education. Early retirement had
a positive impact on the skill premium as well as did welfare state programs. Two op-
posite results emerge: ﬁrst, the educational policies had diverging effects. In France,
the expansionary policy stimulated the stock of skills and exerted a negative impact
on the skill premium. In the US, the skill premium has been boosted by restrictive
policies for the last thirty years; second, the impact of technical shocks was different.
In France, the skill-biased technical shock had a slightly negative impact on the skill
premium: this is because the effective skill-biased technical change has been very low
between 1960 and 1990, but is expected to be strong in the next decades; such expec-
tations have increased the supply of skills, but not the demand yet; hence, the current
skill premium is depressed. In the US, the impact of the skill biased technical change
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is strongly positive. This is the usual effect put forward a.o. by Machin and Reenen
(1998): the technical change has had a clear effect of increasing the relative demand for
skilled workers.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we study the sensitivity of the identiﬁcation procedure to the assump-
tion that the skill premium is constant after the year 2000. For that purpose, we con-
sider two alternative scenarios about the evolution of the skill premium between 2000
and 2050. The ﬁrst scenario considers an increasing skill premium (+15% from 2010
onwards compared to the baseline). The second scenario considers a decreasing skill
premium (-15% from 2010 onwards).
Figure 8 presents the sensitivity of the skill biased technical change and the edu-
26cation subsidy rate and shows that the identiﬁed skill bias is highly robust between
1950 and 2000. The bias is only affected by skill premium expectations after 2000. The
identiﬁed education subsidy rate is more sensitive from the eighties onwards, but es-
pecially after 1990. Considering an increasing (a decreasing) skill premium requires
a lower (a higher) education subsidy rate to match observed educational attainment.
Clearly, our conclusion about the changes in education policy still hold. Between 1960
and 2000, the French educational policy was expansionary. On the contrary, the US
policy was less generous over the period 1980-2000 than in 1960. As a consequence,
the general picture presented in Tables 1 and 2 remains valid, but the magnitude of the
impact of educational policies and technical changes on human capital investments
and on the return to skill is likely to be sensitive to skill premium expectations for 1990
and 2000.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an original model where education and experience are two com-
ponents of human capital. Education choices are endogenous and households face
lifetime uncertainty. This model is used to compute how education choices and re-
turns to skills are affected by demographic changes, welfare, ﬁscal and educational
policies, technical changes, increases in female participation rates, and decreases in the
effective retirement age. Exogenous processes for technical progress and private cost
of education have been identiﬁed by letting the model match observed skill premium
and investment in education. We have then proceeded with counterfactual experi-
ments and compute the endogenous path for skill premium and education when each
exogenous variable is kept at its 1960 level.
Our method allows us to identify technical and policy shocks affecting the US and
the French economies on the post-war period. Between 1970 and 2000, we show that
the skill-biased technical change was strong in the US and affected France with a delay.
Over the same period, the French educational policy was highly expansionary whilst
it progressively became discouraging in the US. We provide several stylized facts ex-
plaining these differences.
In terms of educational attainment, the impact of the changes in ﬁscal policy (taxes
and transfers) and in demographics is rather low in both countries. The increasing
27participationrateoffemalesinthelabormarketexplainsapartoftheriseininvestment
in education. The major difference between France and the US concerns the role of
educational policies: the French educational policy had a positive impact on education
investment especially in the seventies and the eighties; in the US, the discouraging
education policy became important in the late seventies and the eighties. In accordance
with common wisdom, the skill-biased technical bias had a positive effect on education
in both countries. In terms of skill premia, two opposite results emerge. First, the
educational policies exerted a negative impact in France and a positive impact in the
US. Second, the skill-biased technical shock had a low impact in France and a strong
impact in the US.
Finally, ourmodelclearlydeserves someextensions. Itwouldinterestingto mixour
supply-side interpretation of experience premium changes with seniority rules and ef-
ﬁciency wage issues. Endogenizing technical changes also appears as a promising
issue. Introducing heterogeneity would enable to study the inequality effects of ed-
ucation policies, especially their effects on social mobility. Our model also provides
an appropriate framework to compare internal responses to aging (such as increasing
the effective retirement age) and external responses (increasing immigration ﬂows) in
regards of the labor market equilibrium. We leave these issues for further research.
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30A Population data
Figure 9 depicts the population structure per age. For graphical exposition, we as-
sume an equal sharing of the population per sex and we distinguish 8 age groups
(from 15-24 to 85-94). Age pyramids for 1960, 2000 and 2050 are reproduced for both
countries. They are normalized by setting the overall size of the 15-24 cohort to unity.
On these pyramids, aging obviously appears: the relative magnitude of high age co-
horts strongly increases over time. The French cumulative survival probabilities are
taken from the INED database and the US proﬁle comes from the Berkeley mortality
database.
B Education and participation rate data
For France, the time invested in education is computed using school attendance mea-
sures for the 15-24 population reported in Estrade and Minni (1996). Our correspond-
ing estimation, as depicted in Figure 10 amounts to 21% in 1960, 28,9% in 1970, 37,5%
in 1980, 51% in 1990 and 59,8% in 2000. For the US, we use the data and projections on
educational attainment by Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000). Giving the skill struc-
ture of the 25-34 population between 1950 and 2000, we compute the time investment
in education of successive cohorts. This gives 24,7% in 1940, 31,8% in 1950, 40,5% in
1960, 52,2% in 1970, 52,1% in 1980 and 59,1% in 1990.
The old age participation rate α is computed using the effective retirement age data
from Blondal and Scarpetta (1997). Figure 11 presents the data for women and men.
We use the average of the two.
C Public ﬁnance data
Three proportional taxes are introduced in our model, the labor income tax, the capital
income tax and indirect taxes. For France, the indirect tax rate and the rate of tax
on capital income are estimated by Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) at 18% and 24%
respectively for 1995. The labor income tax rate is endogenous in the model but needs
a target value: it has been estimated by Eurostat (1999) at 44% in 1995. For the US, we
31calibrate these tax rates in such a way that the shares of revenues in GDP correspond
to the estimations of Gokhale, Page, and Sturrock (1999), i.e. 8% for labor income, 7%
for indirect taxes and 5% for capital income in 2000.
In our simulations, we consider (i) that the French tax rate on consumption expen-
ditures increases linearly from 10% in 1940 to 18% in 1990 and (ii) that the tax rate on
capital income increases from 15% to 24% over the same period. The same evolution
is applied to the US tax rates (from 8% to 14% for the indirect tax rate and from 10% to
28% for the capital income tax rate).
We distinguish two types of government spending (net of debt charges), i.e. non
age-speciﬁc public consumption and age-speciﬁc transfers. For the composition of
these categories, we build on Crettez, Feist, and Raffel¨ uschen (1999)) for France and
Gokhale, Page, and Sturrock (1999) for the US. The history of non age-speciﬁc spend-
ing is based on OECD data for the period 1960-1995. We assume a constant share in
GDP for future years, i.e. 11% for France (excluding education) and 14% for the US
(including non tertiary education). For age-speciﬁc transfers, we use age proﬁles com-
puted for generational accounting exercises. The French proﬁle is taken from Crettez,
Feist, and Raffel¨ uschen (1999) and includes welfare beneﬁts such as pensions, hous-
ing, RMI program, child and youth support, health care, education and other transfers.
The US proﬁle is taken from Gokhale, Page, and Sturrock (1999) and includes OASDI,
medicare and medicaid, tertiary education and other transfers. We incorporate a neg-
ative term capturing some taxes (of relatively small amount) which are not explicitly
modelled such as the property tax or seigniorage revenue. These age-speciﬁc transfers
are increasing with age. They are usually more important in France than in the US,
especially for individuals aged 55 and more.
Social security beneﬁts and other individual transfers evolve exogenously. Between
1960 and 2000, their level are re-scaled proportionally so as to reproduce the time
path of public transfer and pension shares in GDP (as reported by OECD). For future
decades, these transfers are adjusted so as to keep the share in GDP constant.
Between 1900 and 2000, the public debt/GDP ratio is exogenously set to its ob-
served value. Observations are taken from OECD statistics for the period 1985-2000.
For previous periods, we use data from the French Treasury Department for France
and from Brown (1990) for the US. For future decades, we assume that the debt ratio is
constant.
32Figure 9: Population by age
French age pyramid - 1960
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Women Men
US age pyramid - 1960
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Women Men
French age pyramid - 2000
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Women Men
US age pyramid - 2000
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Women Men
French age pyramid - 2050
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Women Men
US age pyramid - 2050
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Women Men
















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Note: education investment is measured by the percentage of time devoted to education between the
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